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a	pathological	condition	and	 to	 refer	 it	 to	medical	 treat-
ment.	We	rely	on	its	being	overcome	after	a	certain	lapse	
of	time.	(1917/1999,	243–4)1 
In	a	 similar	vein,	DSM-5,	our	 contemporary	 standard	 for	 classifying	
mental	illnesses,	states:	
The	 dysphoria	 in	 grief	 is	 likely	 to	 decrease	 in	 intensity	










1.	 I	 take	 “mourning”	 and	 “grief”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 emotion	—	what	 in	Ger-
man	 is	 rendered	as	 “Trauer.”	My	 interest	 is	 in	 the	emotional	experience	of	
grief	—	paradigmatically	of	being	sad	—	and	not	in	the	practice	of	grieving.	








puts	it	at	the	opening	of	his	book	The Other Side of Sadness:	



















or	 changes	wrought	by	 the	death	may	have	 to	be	dealt	

















1. Clarifying the Puzzle
In	this	section,	I	would	like	to	make	the	puzzle	I	just	sketched	more	
vivid	and	also	clarify	 some	aspects	of	 it.	What	 I	hope	 to	make	plau-






1.1 Surprise, Anticipation, Retrospection





2.	 Although	there	 is	a	 large	 literature	on	grief,	 I	 take	 the	puzzle	 I	describe	 to	
be	 novel.	 I	 discuss	 some	 of	 the	 literature	 in	 what	 follows.	 Moller	 (2007)	
and	Nussbaum	(2001,	ch.1)	have	been	especially	influential	in	my	thinking.	
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I	 (naïvely)	 expected	my	 grief	 to	 continue,	 because	 I	 thought	 of	my	







perience	of	grief	quite	well:	 I	 took	grief	 to	be	a	manifestation	of	my	














this	 is	 jarring	when	we	also	anticipate	 the	continued	 importance	of	
5.	 As	Higgins	(2013,	159)	reports,	Solomon	says	this	in	his	unpublished	lecture	
“Good	Grief.”	In	True to Our Feelings,	he	says,	“Grief	is	…	a	way	of	keeping	the	
love	alive”	(2007,	74).
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My	puzzle	arises	because	it	is	difficult	in	retrospect	to	identify	the	

















shows	 that	 it	would	be	 important	 for	me	not	 to	grieve.	Also,	 it	may	

























I	 realize	 that	 when	my	mother	 died,	 I	 had	 very	 good	 reason	 to	
grieve.	I	also	acknowledge	that	today,	a	decade	after	her	death,	I	am	

















































Indeed,	 it	 remains	 puzzling	 to	 me	 why	 Nussbaum’s	 second	





The	first	 reason	 is	 that	grief	may	 involve	an	element	of	shock	or	
surprise,	especially	if	a	loved	one’s	death	was	unexpected,	and	this	is	
something	that	one	adjusts	to	fairly	quickly.	The	second	is	that	over	














no	 longer	 expect	 to	make	happy	plans	 to	 celebrate	her	
birthday.	(2001,	80)










9.	 This	discussion	is	anticipated	in	Nussbaum’s	The Therapy of Desire	(1994,	375–
89).	See	also	her	recent	Anger and Forgiveness	for	the	contrast	between	grief	
and	anger	(2016,	126).	
























explain	how	we	are	 to	understand	 in	 retrospect	why	we	grieve	 less	
and	why	we	may	eventually	stop	grieving	altogether	—	again	without	




































our	 relationship	 to	 her	matters	 a	 great	 deal.	 That	 is	 because	 the	 re-
lationship	 to	 the	dead	 at	 least	 partly	 determines	 the	 significance	of	
our	 reasons	 to	 grieve.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
was	my	mother	 who	 died	 that	 I	 have	 particularly	 strong	 reason	 to	
grieve	—	more	 reason	 than	a	 friend	or	a	 stranger.	However,	 the	 rela-
tionship	is	not	itself	my	reason;	rather,	it	is	that	in	virtue	of	which	my	
11.	 I	am	indebted	to	Faye	Halpern	for	discussion	of	this	issue.	







A	related	observation	—	though	one	 I	do	not	 take	 to	be	as	 impor-
tant	—	is	that	we	criticize	or	praise	others’	emotional	responses.	Meur-




















unconvincing,	but	 I	 think	that	only	consideration	of	 the	Anscombean	why-
question	makes	this	clear.	













A	fundamental	assumption	of	my	puzzle	 is	 that	grief	 is,	 in	principle,	
responsive	to	reasons.	In	this	section	I	will	clarify	this	assumption	and	
defend	its	plausibility.
	The	assumption	 seems	plausible,	because	our	 emotions	 are	not	




happens	 in	the	world	—	unlike,	 for	 instance,	a	 fever,	which	we	don’t	
experience	 in light of something,	despite	 the	 fact	 that,	quite	 like	 the	
pangs	of	grief,	it	comes	and	goes.	The	apprehension	involved	in	grief	
















cobson	 (2000;	 2003)	 and	Nussbaum	 (2001)	 for	 endorsements	of	 the	view	
that	emotions	are	reasons-responsive,	though	on	different	grounds.
16.	 Anscombe	(1957/2000).	







































nor	 one	 to	which	we	 think	 they	 should	 comply.	 In	 our	
















(let	 alone	 one’s	 fears	 or	 regrets)	 through	 some	 explicit	






to	me	 that	an	attitude	 is	 reasons-responsive:	 the	question	why	 to	have	an	
attitude	clearly	finds	application.	Thus	I	think	that	Wollheim’s	picture	could	
allow	that	emotions	are	reasons-responsive,	though	perhaps	not	in	the	same	
way	 as	 beliefs.	 For	 a	 similar	 view	 to	Wollheim’s,	which	 nonetheless	 takes	
emotions	to	be	reasons-responsive,	see	de	Sousa	(1987,	esp.	ch.7).



















Persistent	 complex	 bereavement	 disorder	 is	 diagnosed	
only	 if	 at	 least	 12	months	 (6	months	 in	 children)	 have	
elapsed	since	 the	death	of	someone	with	whom	the	be-
reaved	had	a	 close	 relationship.	…	This	 time	 frame	dis-
criminates	normal	grief	from	persistent	grief.	(American	
Psychological	Association,	2013)
Persistent	 grief	 is	 a	mental	 disorder	 of	 sorts,	 though	DSM-5	 lists	 it	
25.	Maurice	Schumann	recalls	Simone	Weil	saying:	“How	can	we	condemn	the	
holocausts	which	are	 in	preparation	or	 are	being	perpetrated	around	us	 if	
we	don’t	condemn,	or	even	 if	acknowledge	the	holocausts	as	 truths	of	 the	
faith	[i.e.	the	killings	described	in	the	Hebrew	Bible]	under	the	pretext	that	





certain	nombre	de	millénaires,	 comme	 si	 le	 temps	 faisait	 quelque	 chose	 à	
l’affaire?”).	I	owe	the	reference	to	Yourgrau	(2010,	127).	See	Yourgrau	(2010)	
for	an	account	of	Weil’s	own	suffering	over	temporally	distant	harms.


















since	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	send	aid	to	 the	past,	but	our	 temporal	dis-
tance	 as	 such	does	not	 seem	 to	 affect	 the	 intrinsic	moral	 facts,	 and	














purposes	—	when	we	are	 trying	 to	settle	what	 reasons	we	have	—	we	could	
see	the	explanation	as	going	the	other	way	around,	from	values	to	reasons.




afterwards	 adaptive	mechanisms	 operate	 so	 as	 immedi-
ately	to	extinguish	any	feelings	of	distress.	(313)
The	Sub-resilient	are	like	us	except	that	they	never	cease	
caring	 as	deeply	 for	 their	 spouses	 as	 at	 the	moment	of	
death;	the	loss	of	that	relationship	is	as	deeply	felt	at	half	




It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 the	 Sub-resilient	 are	 not	 the	more	 rational	 spe-






































sion	 in	Dan	Moller’s	paper,	 “Love	and	Death”	 (2007,	 313–5).	Moller	
asks	us	to	consider	two	kinds	of	alien	species	—	the	Super-resilient	and	
the	Sub-resilient:






26.	Wilkinson	 (2000)	 argues	 that	 normal	 grief	 is	 a	 mental	 disorder	 on	 the	
grounds	that	it	is	not	a	rational	state.	I	hold	that	since	normal	grief	is	rational,	
or,	rather,	reasons-responsive,	it	is	not	a	mental	disorder.
27.	 Compare	 here	Wittgenstein’s	 remarks	 about	 hope,	 deep	 feeling	 and	 grief	
(Wittgenstein	1953/2003,	§583,	pt.	II,	sect.	ix).
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time.	Other	things	being	equal,	it	is	not	fitting	to	feel	the	
same	 intense	 emotion	 towards	 past	 sufferings	 that	 oc-
curred	 thousands	of	years	back	 in	 the	past	as	we	do	 to-
wards	some	current	suffering	of	the	same	severity.
In	all	 these	cases,	 the	degree	 to	which	 it	 is	fitting	 to	
positively	 respond	 to	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 does	 not	 corre-
spond	to	the	degree	to	which	it	is	good.	How	strongly	one	
should	favour	an	objectively	valuable	object	depends	on	
the	 ‘distance’	between	oneself	 and	 the	object.	…	 [T]his	
distance	has	many	dimensions,	including	modal	distance,	
temporal	distance,	and	‘personal’	distance.	It	is,	therefore,	












I	want	 to	 register	a	phenomenological	objection	 to	 this	proposal.	
It	strikes	me	that	thinking,	“It’s	not	my	mother,”	makes	sense	of	why	I	
don’t	grieve	in	a	way	that	saying,	“She	died	long	ago,”	does	not.	Here	
29.	For	 a	 similar	 argument	 about	 blameworthiness,	 see	 Coleman	 and	 Sarch	
(2012).	 Like	Bykvist,	Coleman	 and	 Sarch	observe	 that	 it	 is	 appropriate	 for	















4. Temporality as Partiality














How	strongly	we	 should	 react	 emotionally	 seems	…	 to	
depend	on	temporal	matters.	For	instance,	we	think	it	is	
fitting	 that	 the	grief	of	a	 lost	beloved	softens	with	 time.	
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ing,	 the	filling,	of	 the	present,	 the	now,	and	this	 is	only	
possible	when	he	 is	 totally	 immersed	 in	 the	 successive	
moments	of	an	act.	It	is	the	“now”	that	bridges	the	abyss.	
(Sacks	2007,	italics	mine)


































“You’ve	 written	 a	 book!”	 he	 cried,	 astonished.	 “Well	
done!	Congratulations!”	He	peered	at	 the	 cover.	 “All	by	
you?	Good	heavens!”	Excited,	he	jumped	for	joy.	Deborah	
showed	him	the	dedication	page:	“For	my	Clive.”	“Dedi-



















a	psychological	 injury	 that	 I	have	 to	 live	with.	 I	 can	see	my	grief	as	
posing	a	problem	for	me	—	something	I	need	to	cope	with	or	manage.	



















35.	 Here	I	follow	what	I	take	to	be	essentially	Moran’s	argument	in	Authority and 
Estrangement	(2001).	
This	suggests	that	a	realistic	moral	psychology	of	grief	and	the	rea-
sons	 for	 it	will	not	see	 the	griever’s	 temporal	distance	to	 the	 loss	as	
a	crucial	feature	but	rather,	the	griever’s	experience	of	grieving	over	
time	—	the	successful	completion	of	the	psychological	process	of	grief.




It	 is	 plausible	 to	 think	 of	 grief	 as	 a	 process	—	a	 process	 through	
which	we	heal	 from	a	psychological	 injury.32	Alternatively,	we	could	
think	of	grief	not	as	the	healing	process	itself	but	as	a	manifestation	of	















33.	 See	Gilbert	 et al.	 (1998)	 for	 an	 account	of	 the	 “emotional	 immune	 system,”	












eliminate	 the	double	 vision.	 The	 crucial	 thought	would	be	 that	 the	
process	of	grief	is	an	intelligent	process.	Perhaps	the	process	of	grief	is	
psychological	work?











































Someone	who	 is	 interested	 in	our	well-being	—	a	doctor,	 say,	or	 the	
HR	department	 in	our	 company,	or	 a	bookie	—	will	be	 interested	 in	
how	 the	healing	process	 is	 coming	 along:	how	much	we	 are	 suffer-
ing,	whether	we	 can	get	back	 to	work,	whether	we	will	 need	 to	 in-
voke	FMLA,	and	so	on.	And,	as	grievers,	we	will	be	interested	in	these	
things,	too.	However,	for	us,	this	is	not	the	whole	story:	for	us,	our	grief	
is	 a	 response	 to	 a	 loss,	 and	 the	 reasons	 that	determine	 the	 reasons-
responsiveness	of	grief	don’t	 seem	 to	have	anything	 to	do	with	 the	
healing	process.	That	is	why,	to	the	extent	that	we	view	ourselves	as	
undergoing	a	process,	we	become	alienated	from	our	grief.	This	shows	









One	 might	 think	 that	 this	 is	 so	 because	 we	 have	 worked	 with	
too	 crude	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 process.	 After	 all,	 grief	 involves	
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Although	 there	 is	 some	plausibility	 in	 the	 thought	 that	grief	 con-











the	 thought	 that	we	will	work	until	 all	weeds	 are	 cleared	 is	 not,	 in	
principle,	disconcerting	—	though	we	might	feel	overwhelmed	at	the	
sight	of	an	overgrown	garden.	There	is	nothing	problematic	as	such	










pay	 respect	 to	 the	dead,	we	 can	acknowledge	our	 loss,	 and	we	 can	
manage our	grief.	Much	of	 this	 is	done	through	various	activities	of	
grieving	—	such	 as	 sitting	 Shiva	—	and	 various	 ways	 of	 coping.	 But	
“bewältigen”	signifies	something	one	would	do	with	a	task.	Man bewältigt eine 
Aufgabe.








reweaving	 one’s	 cognitive	 fabric	 in	 consequence.	 I	 find	
myself	about	to	pick	up	the	telephone	to	tell	[my	mother]	
what	 has	 just	 happened	—	and	 then	 see	before	me	 that	
image	 of	 her	 lying	 in	 the	 hospital	 bed,	 with	 the	 tube	
coming	out	of	her	nose.	In	every	area	of	my	life	in	which	
she	has	played	a	part,	 I	find	myself	expecting	her	to	ap-



















38.	 Indeed,	 something	 like	 this	 lies	 behind	 the	 notion	 of	 Vergangenheitsbewäl-
tigung	—	a	 very	 prominent	 notion	 in	 public	 discourse	 in	 Germany	 (which,	
via	Adorno,	who	 coined	 the	 term,	 goes	 back	 to	 Freud).	 The	German	 verb	






Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 an	 insight	 in	 the	work	view.	The	 insight	 is	
that	 grief	 is	 (concomitant	 to)	 a	 process	 through	which	we	 come	 to	
terms	with	a	loss.	But	this	insight	has	to	be	captured	differently.	Grief	
is	best	understood	as	 akin	 to	 a	 judgment	with	 a	 temporally	 limited	
functional	role.	However,	the	functional	role	is	not	part	of	the	content	
of	grief.	The	 functional	 role	of	grief	 is	 like	 the	 functional	 role	of	 an	

















To	do	 so,	 I	will	draw	on	 Jean-Paul	Sartre’s	 account	of	bad	 faith.	 Sar-
tre	famously	described	two	paradigmatic	ways	of	being	in	bad	faith.43 
The	first	is	to	treat	oneself	as	an	object	or,	to	put	it	 in	Sartre’s	terms,	



































ment,	 there	 is	no	 sense	of	 accomplishment	at	 the	end	of	 it,	 and	hence	no	
triumph	over	a	job	well	done.





























However,	 this	very	 reflection	distorts,	and	 indeed	changes,	his	moral	 judg-
ment	as	he	becomes	guilty	of	self-absorption.	This,	of	course,	constitutes	a	
further	moral	failure	—	and	one	that	is	not	lost	on	the	man,	which	results	in	













However,	we	 can	 readily	 see	 that	 both	 kinds	 of	 bad	 faith	 are	 avail-
able	with	 regard	 to	our	emotions.	We	can	 treat	our	emotions	as	ob-
jects,	too:	We	do	so	when	we	take	a	theoretical	view	of	them	—	when	
we	see	them	as	a	process	that	we	undergo.	In	so	doing,	we	disregard	
our	 freedom.	Of	course,	 this	 is	not	 the	 freedom	we	enjoy	 in	action;	















and	 facticity	at	once.	We	suffer	 from	an	 ineliminable	double	vision:	
We	can	apprehend	ourselves	as	free	and,	therein,	attend	to	the	world	
and	 respond	 to	 our	 reasons	—	be	 it	 our	 reasons	 for	 action	 or	 emo-
tion	 or	 belief.	 Or	 we	 can	 apprehend	 ourselves	 as	 creatures	 with	 a	
44.	 This	is	the	topic	of	Marušić	(2013;	2015).	
45.	 See	Wolf	(1990).




Death	 is	 unacceptable.	Nonetheless,	we	 realize	 that,	 in	 time,	we	
will	 accept	all	deaths,	even	 if	perhaps	we	don’t	 fully	 come	 to	 terms	
with	them.	And	this	is	somehow	all	right.	It	is	a	good	thing	that	we	do,	
but	that	is	not	what	makes	it	all	right.	I	am	at	a	loss	to	say	what	does,	




emotions	—	most	 importantly	 anger.	We	 accommodate	 ourselves	 to	
loss,	 and	we	 accommodate	 ourselves	 to	 injustice.	 If,	 indeed,	 this	 is	
somehow	all	right	but	we	can’t	say	why,	how	can	we	properly	come	to	
terms	with	our	past?50
50.	This	paper	has	been	 long	 in	 the	making,	 and	 I	have	 incurred	many	debts	
of	 gratitude	 in	writing	 it.	The	paper	was	originally	 inspired	by	 a	 conversa-
tion	with	Matt	Boyle.	Ongoing	conversations	with	Matt,	as	well	as	Eli	Hirsch,	
Douglas	Lavin,	Amélie	Rorty	and	especially	Agnes	Callard	have	deeply	 in-
formed	 the	 paper.	 For	 helpful	 conversations,	 comments	 or	 suggestions,	 I	
am	also	indebted	to	Anke	Breunig,	Claudia	Blöser,	Rachel	Cohon,	Stephen	
Darwall,	 Sanja	 Dembić,	 James	Dreier,	 Jeremy	 Fantl,	William	 Flesch,	 Anna	
Flocke,	Rebekka	Gersbach,	Matthias	Haase,	Faye	Halpern,	Pamela	Hierony-
mi,	Thomas	Khurana,	Christian	Kietzmann,	Arden	Koehler,	Hilary	Kornblith,	
Richard	 Kraut,	 John	 Maier,	 Jennifer	 S.	 Marušić,	 Victoria	 McGeer,	 Richard	
Moran,	Oded	Na’aman,	Lucy	O’Brien,	Alejandro	Pérez	Carballo,	Philip	Pettit,	
Nicholas	Riggle,	Sebastian	Rödl,	Geoff	Sayre-McCord,	Kieran	Setiya,	David	















getting:	 Both	 involve	 a	 change	 of	mind.	 But	we	 neither	 forget,	 nor	
cease	grieving,	 in light of	a	reason.	Forgetting,	 like	the	diminution	of	
grief,	is	something	that	happens	to	us.	And	it	happens	to	us	for	good	
reasons:	we	are	creatures	with	a	 limited	capacity	 for	memory	and	a	
























49.	 See	Williams’s	 (1973)	Makropulos	 case,	 and	 recent	 discussion	 by	 Scheffler	
(2013).
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